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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jamie Lee Nelson appeals from the Memorandum Decision and Order on
Restitution, entered following the remand from her prior appeal in Docket No.
40493, in which she challenged, in relevant part, the district court's failure to
conduct a restitution hearing before entering reimbursement for prosecution
costs under I.C. § 37-2732(k). Although the remand was solely for purposes of
conducting a hearing, Nelson now challenges the constitutionality of I.C. § 372732(k) as applied to her case.

She also claims the new restitution award

amounts to vindictive sentencing and is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2012, a jury found Nelson guilty of possession of a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

1

(#40493 R., p.241.)

At

Nelson's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested "4,846 in restitution" "$100 for drug testing [and] $4,746 in prosecution costs." (Tr., p.11, Ls.17-23.)
The prosecutor explained the prosecution costs were "for approximately 39
hours of prosecution attorney time applied to the prosecutor in the case from the
time the case hit district court," but did not "account for pre-district court
arraignment costs," because those numbers were not "available at the time."
(Tr., p.12, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel responded:

1

The Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the record in this case
with the record from Nelson's appeal prior to remand, State v. Nelson, Docket
No. 40493. (R., p.2.)

1

.. [A]s the court points out, there's not documentation as to
the prosecutor's request for their portion. I can tell the court that
Ms. Nelson has no objection to the $100 for the lab fee, but as to
the rest, we'd ask the court to either [sic] flat deny it. It is within the
court's discretion on whether that's granted.
If the court's inclined to grant it, we'd ask the court to not
enter an order today on the restitution but require the state to
provide further documentation on that. Particularly, as the court's
well aware, this case was tried twice because the state's witness
caused a mistrial, and I think it would be unfair if the court was
inclined to grant restitution for Ms. Nelson to be responsible for
paying any costs from the first trial, so if the court's inclined to do
that, we'd ask a specific split down on those areas.
(Tr., p.20, Ls.3-19.)
The district court "recognize[d] there were no other specific number[s]
related to prosecution costs presented," but calculated $2,535.00 in prosecution
costs based on "39 hours at $65 an hour," which it said was "the loaded benefit
rate of an Ada County Prosecuting Attorney." (Tr., p.29, Ls.2-8.) The district
court subsequently entered judgment, which included a provision that required
Nelson to pay "Law Enforcement Investigation and Prosecution Costs, pursuant
to Idaho Code §37-2732(k), in the amount of ... $2,535.00; jointly and severally
with Adam Nelson," who was Nelson's co-defendant. (#40493 R., pp.289-291.)
On appeal, Nelson challenged the award entered pursuant to I.C. § 372732(k), claiming it was unsupported by any evidence, "let alone substantial
evidence."

(#40493 Appellant's Brief, p.11 (punctuation modified).)
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Nelson

asked that the state "be barred from seeking to establish restitution for
prosecution costs." (Id. at p.13.) As an alternative argument, Nelson asserted
that "ordering restitution for time spent on the first trial (which ended in a mistrial
caused by a State's witness violating a pre-trial order) was inappropriate
because it was not caused by [her] conduct."

(Id.)

Addressing Nelson's

complaints regarding the award of prosecution costs, the Court of Appeals
concluded remand was "appropriate under the circumstances of this case where
the district court declined a request for an evidentiary hearing after Nelson
objected to the state's inadmissible proffer." State v. Nelson, Docket No. 40493,
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 387 *5-6 (Idaho App. Feb. 21, 2014) ("Nelson").
On remand, the district court scheduled a restitution hearing at which the
prosecutor submitted Exhibit 1 as evidence of the prosecution costs for Nelson's
case.

(Tr., p.45, Ls.1-12; R., p.25.)

Pursuant to Nelson's request, the court

permitted the parties to submit their restitution arguments in writing. (Tr., p.46,
L.20 - p.45, L.7.) After the parties submitted their briefs, the court entered a
Memorandum Decision and Order on Restitution (R., pp.35-41), an Amended
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Retained Jurisdiction (R., pp.43-46), as
well as a separate Order for Restitution and Judgment (R., pp.47-48). All three
documents reflect a restitution award in the amount of $4,746.00 for prosecution
costs ("jointly and severally with Adam Nelson"), and a $100.00 award for drug
testing. (R., pp.41, 44, 48.) Nelson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.4950.)

3

ISSUES
Nelson states the issues on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred in ordering Ms. Nelson to pay
$4,746 in restitution for the prosecution costs in this case?
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Does Nelson's constitutional challenge fail because the restitution award
authorized by I.C. § 37-2732(k) is not an unconstitutional penalty?

2.

Should this Court decline to consider Nelson's vindictive sentencing claim
because the claim is not preserved and is not subject to review under the
fundamental error doctrine?
Alternatively, does Nelson's vindictive
sentencing claim fails as a matter of fact and law?

3.

Has Nelson failed to show there was insufficient evidence to support the
district court's restitution award under I.C. § 37-2732(k)?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Nelson Has Failed To Show The Restitution Award Entered Pursuant To LC. §
37-2732(k) Is An Unconstitutional Penalty

Introduction

A.

Nelson contends the district court's restitution award under LC. § 372732(k) is an unconstitutional penalty because, she argues, the award punished
her for exercising her right to a jury trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-16.) Review of
the relevant law shows Nelson's constitutional argument lacks merit

R

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de novo.

State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131

(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the
statute.

kl

The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute

that upholds its constitutionality.

kl

5

C.

The District Court's Restitution Award, Authorized By I.C. § 37-2732(k), Is
Not An Unconstitutional Punishment
Nelson argues, as she did below for the first time following remand, 2 that

the restitution award for prosecution costs entered pursuant to I. C. § 37-2732(k)
is an unconstitutional punishment because it allegedly punished her for
exercising her right to a jury trial. (R., p.31; Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Nelson
claims this is so because the award would have been less had she pied guilty.
(R., pp.31-32; Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.)

While it is true that the cost of

prosecution is decreased when a defendant pleads guilty, this factual reality
does not mean the award is unconstitutional punishment. Although Nelson cites
general legal principles for the proposition that it is "patently unconstitutional" to
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right, she cites no case that supports the
conclusion she wants this Court to reach. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-15.) In fact,
several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have rejected
arguments similar to the one Nelson advances.
In United States v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953, 953 (9 th Cir. 1980), the
government charged Chavez with willfully failing to file an income tax return.
Chavez "filed a motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that the statute

2

Nelson's constitutional claim was not raised before or as part of the initial
appeal prior to remand. As such, the state questions whether her claim is barred
by law of the case. See State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 72, 305 P.3d 513, 516
(2013) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine 'prevents consideration on a subsequent
appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier
appeal.'"); Bouten Const. Co v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992
P.2d 751, 757 (2000) (citation omitted) (if an issue was "not raised at the trial
court level nor to the Court of Appeals on the first appeal, it will not be
considered by this Court"). Nevertheless, the state will address the merits of
Nelson's claim.

6

was unconstitutional" because the statute's "costs of prosecution provision was
mandatory," and "chilled the exercise of his constitutional rights" - specifically,
his rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, and to compulsory process.
954-955.

kl at

The Ninth Circuit, citing Supreme Court precedent, noted that it is

"clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional
right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid."
Chavez at 956 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978)). The
court rejected Chavez's constitutional complaints, reasoning:
In the instant case we find that any pressures upon the
defendant to waive his constitutional rights that may exist on
account of the costs of prosecution provision are not such as to
compel this court to find the Congressional scheme
unconstitutional. A defendant, prosecuted for willful failure to file a
tax return, is not subject to a substantial risk of greater punishment
because of the existence of the costs of prosecution provision.
The provision does serve legitimate governmental purposes. We
cannot say with any confidence that the costs of prosecution
provision of [the statute] does in fact penalize a defendant's
exercise of his constitutional rights. [The statute] provides for a
punishment of not more than $10,000.00, or more than one year
imprisonment, or both. Any sentence that would be imposed upon
conviction, within those bounds, would be within the ordinary
discretion of the trial judge. The presence of the mandatory costs
of prosecution provision does not, with any degree of certainty,
substantially increase the threatened punishment.
Any
encouragement of the waiver of constitutional rights that this
provision may induce is substantially different from the pressures
that undeniably existed in [United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968)], and cannot be said to be an impermissible burden upon
the exercise of constitutional rights. In light of the fact that the
provision does serve legitimate government purposes, we cannot
say that it needlessly encourages the waiver of constitutional rights.
Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956-957.
Nelson, like the defendant in Chavez, also relies on Jackson in support of
her argument.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 13-15.)
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Jackson, however, does not

support Nelson's constitutional claim. At issue in Jackson was a federal statute
that, in the Court's words, provided: "In an interstate kidnaping case where the
victim has not been liberated unharmed, the defendant's assertion of the right to
jury trial may cost him his life, for the federal statute authorizes the jury-and
only the jury-to return a verdict of death." Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572. In other
words, the death penalty was "applicable only to those defendants who assert
the right to contest their guilt before a jury."

!it at 581.

The Supreme Court held

this was unconstitutional because it impermissibly chilled the exercise of a
constitutional right

!it at 581-582.

Unlike the selective death penalty provision at issue in Jackson, Idaho
Code§ 37-2732(k) does not impermissibly chill a defendant's right to a jury trial.
The statute provides, in relevant part:
Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under
this chapter ... , the court may order restitution for costs incurred
by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation. Law
enforcement agencies shall include, but not be limited to, the Idaho
state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office
of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney
offices. Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for
the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement
officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation,
hearings and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution
expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of
employees.
I.C. § 37-2732(k).
The restitution award authorized by I.C. § 37-2732(k) is not premised
upon whether the defendant exercises her right to a jury trial. That costs may be
more, and therefore the restitution award greater, if the defendant proceeds to
trial does not mean the statute impermissibly chills the exercise of the right to a

8

jury trial.

To conclude otherwise would effectively negate the ability to offer

reduced charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea - a practice that is
clearly constitutionally sound. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802 (1989)
(citations omitted) ("we have upheld the prosecutorial practice of threatening a
defendant with increased charges if he does not plead guilty, and following
through on that threat if the defendant insists on his right to stand trial" and "we
have recognized that the same mutual interests that support the practice of plea
bargaining to avoid trial may also be pursued directly by providing for a more
lenient sentence if the defendant pleads guilty").
Nelson's reliance on Jackson also ignores that subsequent Supreme
Court cases have "not enthusiastically embraced the 'chill' rationale articulated in
Jackson."

Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956.

In relation to Nelson's constitutional

challenge, the most notable post-Jackson Supreme Court case is Fuller v.
Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).

In Fuller, the Court considered "whether Oregon

may constitutionally require a person convicted of a criminal offense to repay to
the State the costs of providing him with effective representation of counsel,
when he is indigent at the time of the criminal proceedings but subsequently
acquires the means to bear the costs of is legal defense."

417 U.S. at 41.

Among Jackson's constitutional arguments was his claim that the reimbursement
provision of the challenged statute "might impel him to decline the services of an
appointed attorney and thus 'chill' his constitutional right to counsel."

~

at 51.

The Court rejected this argument because "[t]he fact that an indigent who
accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be

9

required to repay the costs of these services in no way effects his eligibility to
obtain counsel."

kl at 53.

Similarly, the fact that a defendant who exercises her

right to trial may have to pay greater restitution costs "in no way effects" her
ability to exercise her constitutional rights.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Fuller, and the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Chavez, several state courts have rejected claims that awards
for prosecution costs are unconstitutional. See, ~ . Ohree v. Commonwealth,
494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("the imposition of the cost of providing
a jury does not impose an excessive or unnecessary burden upon the exercise
of the right of a jury trial under the United States Constitution"); State v. Albert,
899 P.2d 103, 116 (Alaska 1995) (state criminal rule authorizing judgment for
payment for services of representation "does not conflict with the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution" or the
state constitution); Commonwealth v. Hower, 406 A.2d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) (although "the possibility that a convicted defendant may be required to
pay the costs of prosecution may impose some burden on a particular
defendant's choice of whether to go to trial or plead guilty and thereby avoid the
costs," "not every burden imposed by the state on a defendant's right to trial is
constitutionally prohibited").
Nelson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that I.C. § 37-2732(k)
is an unconstitutional punishment.

10

11.
This Court Should Decline To Consider Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing Claim
Because It Is Not Preserved And Is Not Reviewable As Fundamental Error;
Alternatively, Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing Claim Is Contrary To The Facts And
The Law

A

Introduction
Nelson argues, for the first time on appeal, that the restitution award

entered on remand amounts to a vindictive sentence because it is more than the
amount originally awarded.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.16-22.)

The Court should

decline to consider Nelson's argument because it is not preserved and is not
reviewable for fundamental error.

Even if considered, Nelson's vindictive

sentencing argument fails factually and legally.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Appellate courts employ a bifurcated standard of reviewing due process
claims on appeal, deferring to the trial court's factual findings but freely reviewing
the application of the law to the facts found. State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786,
788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 796, 932
P.2d 907, 919 (Ct. App. 1997). "An allegation of vindictiveness presents a subtle
and narrow question.

To determine whether the sentence was vindictively

11

imposed, [the Court] look[s] to the totality of the circumstances and examines the
words and actions of the judge as a whole." Stedtfeld v. State, 114 Idaho 273,
276,755 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Ct. App. 1988).

C.

This Court Should Decline To Consider Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing
Claim Because It Is Not Preserved And Because It Is Not Reviewable For
Fundamental Error
Nelson does not dispute that she did not raise a vindictive sentence

objection to the district court, but claims she was not required to "because the
district court's decision was the source of the error" and, according to Nelson,
she "did not have a meaningful opportunity to challenge that decision below."
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) In support of this assertion, Nelson relies on State v.
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998), and the
exception cited therein that an issue will be considered if it was addressed by the
trial court.

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This exception has no application to this

case because the district court never decided whether the restitution order was
vindictive.

Moreover, Nelson's claim that she "did not have a meaningful

opportunity to challenge that decision below" is belied by the record.
At the restitution hearing on remand, the state submitted a request for
$4,746.00 - the same amount it originally requested before Nelson appealed
and the case was remanded.

(Compare R., p.25 with Tr., p.11, Ls.22-23.)

Nelson was given the opportunity to file a written objection to the requested
award, which she did, and could have argued, at that time, that the court was
precluded from ordering the state's requested restitution because such an award
would, in her view, constitute vindictive sentencing. Nelson, however, made no

12

such argument. (See generally R., pp.30-33.) Nor did she file a motion after the
court entered its amended judgment challenging the award on this basis; a
motion she clearly could have filed.

Nelson's claim that she did not have a

"meaningful opportunity to challenge" the restitution ordered on remand is
disingenuous.
Nelson alternatively asserts that, "even if this Court decides the issue was
not preserved, vindictive sentencing is reviewable as fundamental error."
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

While Nelson is correct that a vindictive sentencing

claim is reviewable as fundamental error, her claim does not qualify as such
because a restitution award is not a sentence.
In State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App.
2010), the defendant claimed, for the first time on appeal, that the district court's
restitution award, entered pursuant to I.C. 37-2732(k), "unconstitutionally
punished him for exercising his statutory and due process right to challenge the
state's restitution request," because the district court included the costs incurred
at the restitution hearing as part of the award. The Court of Appeals rejected
Mosqueda's argument that the claim could be raised for the first time on appeal,
concluding that, "restitution, while attendant to a criminal conviction and mostoften adjudicated at the sentencing hearing, is not part of a defendant's
'sentence.'

Instead, a restitution proceeding is, in essence, a civil proceeding

distinct from the criminal case."
footnote omitted).

kt

at 834, 252 P.3d at 567 (citations and

Because the fundamental error doctrine only "allows a

criminal defendant the opportunity, in strictly limited circumstances, to raise an

13

issue challenging his conviction on direct appeal that was not formally
preseNed," and because a restitution proceeding is civil in nature, the Court held
"the fundamental error doctrine may not be invoked to raise a restitution issue for
the first time on appeal because restitution proceedings are civil in nature."

.kl

The Court, therefore, "decline[d] to address" Mosqueda's vindictive sentencing
claim.

.kl

The Court in this case should likewise decline to address Nelson's

unpreseNed vindictive sentencing claim.

D.

Even If Considered, Nelson's Vindictive Sentencing Claim Fails Under
The Facts And The Law
Even if this Court considers Nelson's vindictive sentencing claim, it fails.

Because Nelson has raised her vindictive sentencing claim for the first time on
appeal, if the Court considers it, it must do so under the fundamental error
standard of review.

Under that standard, "an appellate court should reverse"

only if Nelson "persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the
appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." State v.
Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 791, 275 P.3d 12, 17 (Ct. App. 2012).
"[l)n North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the Court held that a
defendant, who had successfully attacked his or her conviction and gained a new
trial, could not be punished with a longer sentence upon retrial for exercising his
or her right to appeal or for otherwise collaterally attacking his or her first

14

conviction." Grist, 152 Idaho at 792, 275 P.3d at 18 (full citations for Pearce and
Smith omitted).

"In that context, the Court determined that, when a court

imposes a more severe sentence upon remand, vindictiveness is presumed but
may be overcome by objective information in the record justifying the increase."
Grist, 152 Idaho at 792, 275 P.3 at 18 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726). "The
Court further determined that a court's reasons for imposing an increased
sentence must be made part of the record and based upon identifiable conduct
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
proceeding."

kl

However, "[i]n a number of cases after Pearce, the Supreme

Court has limited the effect of the Pearce presumption." State v. Robbins, 123
Idaho 527, 531, 850 P.2d 176, 180 (1993) (citing cases). In one of those cases,
Alabama v. Smith, "the Supreme Court reversed a state court's application of the
Pearce presumption where the original sentence was based on a guilty plea and

the greater sentence followed a full trial." Robbins, 123 Idaho at 531, 850 P.2d
at 180 (citing Smith, 490 U.S. 794). In doing so, the "Supreme Court noted that
a full trial would bring out more information about the defendant and the crime
than a guilty plea and would give the sentencing judge a fuller appreciation of the
nature and extent of the crimes."

kl

"The Supreme Court held that in order to

apply the Pearce presumption there must be a 'reasonable likelihood' that the
trial court's greater sentence was based on actual vindictiveness."

kL.

Nelson claims she is entitled to the Pearce presumption because "the
same judge issued both restitution orders," the "court's order on restitution was
expressly reversed and it was told to do the restitution proceedings over again,"
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and-the "court's comments on remand demonstrate that it was being asked to do
over again what it thought it had done correctly." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) The
court's "comments" Nelson relies on are: "Whenever I got the court of appeals'
decision, I looked at it and, thought, good grief.

What was it that I did?"

(Appellant's Brief, p.19 (quoting Tr., p.40, Ls.12-14).)

According to Nelson,

"[t]hose comments . . . demonstrate the district court's stake in the prior
decision." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Nelson's arguments are without merit.
First, the district court's comment that it did not know what it did wrong,
was followed by the statements: "And so I pulled the sentencing transcript, and
I've provided a copy to each one of the parties.

So we need a restitution

hearing." (Tr., p.40, Ls.14-16.) The court's comments in no way demonstrate
vindictiveness, but instead show the district court's efforts to ascertain what it did
wrong at the prior hearing.

Nelson's attempt to construe the district court's

comments as vindictive is, at best, a stretch.
Second, assuming the standards for vindictive sentencing even apply to a
restitution proceeding, the Pearce presumption would not apply in this case for
the same reasons it did not apply in Smith. This case was remanded for the
purpose of conducting a restitution hearing at which the state could present
evidence in support of its request.

Nelson would apparently have the district

court ignore the evidence provided after remand, and simply reinstate the prior
restitution award, which was based on no evidence.
legally suspect.

Such action would be

As in Smith, the restitution award changed because it was

based on more information, which is what the Court of Appeals required when it
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remanded the case. Nelson's claim that the restitution award entered on remand
was the product of vindictiveness is unsupported by the facts or the law.
Operating on the assumption that the Pearce presumption applies, Nelson
acknowledges that the presumption can be overcome if there is new information
not previously presented, but claims that did not occur in this case because,
according to her, "the State presented the exact same information in support of
its request."

(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)

This argument is based on a

misunderstanding of the purpose of the Court's remand. The Court remanded
for a restitution hearing because the prior restitution award was "supported only
by an oral, unsworn representation of the prosecutor as to the amount of costs."
Nelson at 5. Thus, the Court remanded the case for a restitution hearing for the
state to present evidence.

kl

While the amount the state requested on remand

was the same, Nelson is incorrect that the state did not present evidence. As
noted, the state submitted Exhibit 1 in support of its request.

That Nelson

believes this evidence was insufficient does not mean no new information was
presented.
Nelson further contends that "even if the State's unsworn written request
were 'new' information, the United States Supreme Court still requires that the
new information 'concern[ ] identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.'" (Appellant's
Brief, p.20 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726) (emphasis added by Nelson).)
Because Exhibit 1 '"provides no new information about Ms. Nelson's conduct
occurring after the original restitution order that would justify the increased
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restitution award," Nelson argues the Pearce presumption cannot be overcome.
(Appellant's Brief, p.21 (emphasis in original).) This argument only supports the
state's position that Pearce does not apply to this case. It defies logic to claim,
as Nelson does, that the state should or could submit "new information about
Ms. Nelson's conduct occurring after the original restitution order" in support of
the restitution request for prosecution costs incurred prior to remand. 3
Finally, Nelson contends that, "even if the presumption does not apply, the
record contains sufficient evidence to actually show vindictiveness." (Appellant's
Brief, p.21.) This argument is premised on the court's "good grief' comment and
the allegedly "unexplained and drastic increase in the restitution calculus after
remand."

(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

For the reasons already stated, Nelson's

characterization of the court's "good grief' comment as vindictive lacks merit.
Her claim that the "increase in the restitution calculus" is "unexplained" also fails.
The district court's initial restitution award was based on its determination,
without any evidence, that the hourly rate of prosecution was $65.00 per hour.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.4-5.) On remand, the only evidence presented was that the rate is
$140.00 per hour. (Exhibit 1.) The increase is explained by the evidence, not by
· any alleged vindictiveness. Nelson's claim to the contrary is belied by the record.
This Court should decline to consider Nelson's vindictive sentencing claim

3

The only relevant "conduct" by Nelson after the initial restitution award would be
her pursuit of a restitution hearing, and Nelson would undoubtedly complain if
the prosecutor requested costs associated with that, although such costs are
permissible under the statute. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 834, 252 P.3d at 567 ("a
reasonable reading of the statute includes costs incurred for law enforcement
employees' attendance at a restitution hearing").
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because it is unpreserved and not subject to review under the fundamental error
doctrine. Even if considered, Nelson has failed to meet her burden of showing
the district court's restitution award entered on remand is the result of
vindictiveness.

111.
Nelson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden Of Showing Error In The District
Court's Restitution Award

A

Introduction
On remand, the district court ordered Nelson to pay restitution for

prosecution costs in the amount of $4,746.00. (R., pp.44, 48.) Nelson contends
there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's restitution award.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-33.) A review of the record and the applicable law
supports the district court's award of restitution; Nelson has failed to meet her
burden of showing otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412,
417 (Ct. App. 2013). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249
P.3d 398, 401 (2011 ).
In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
"conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine" whether the trial court (1) "correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion"; (2) "acted within the boundaries of
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such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it"; and (3) "reached its decision by an exercise of
reason."

State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167,

, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App.

2014) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Restitution Award
"Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. § 37-2732(k)

once a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under Title 37,
Chapter 27 of the Idaho Code."4 State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-258, 281
P.3d 90, 94-95 (2012). "Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short on specific guidance
regarding the nature of a restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an
award, we find guidance in the general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304." kl,;
also Weaver, 158 Idaho at _ , 345 P.3d at 229 (citing Gomez, supra and
Mosqueda, supra).) Under that statute, a restitution award must be based "upon
the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim,
or presentence investigator." Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 229 (citing
1.C. § 19-5304(6)).) A restitution award "will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence."

kL.

(citations omitted).

"Substantial evidence is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."

kl

(citing Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276).

"The state's certified

accounting of the time it spent prosecuting the case, even if only an estimate,

4

Nelson does not dispute that she was convicted of a qualifying crime for
purposes of restitution under I.C. § 37-2732(k).
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constitutes substantial evidence to support" a restitution award for prosecution
costs. Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 229.
In awarding $4,746.00 for prosecution costs in this case, the district court
"considered State's Exhibit 1, the presentence investigation, and the arguments
of counsel." (R., p.35.) The district court's factual findings include the following:
State's Exhibit 1 is a Statement of Costs and Request for
Restitution in a Drug Case, signed by James Vogt, a Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney, the assigned handling attorney for the
prosecution of Jamie and Adam Nelson. The exhibit states the
Ada County Prosecutor's Office "keeps records regarding the
attorney time spent prosecuting drug cases in anticipation of
submitting a request for restitution ... " and that Mr. Vogt "reviewed
the time log in this case, which documents the prosecutor time
spent prosecuting the above referenced drug case." It then states
a minimum of 33.9 attorney hours at an attorney rate of $140.00
per hour, not including preparation and argument for sentencing
hearing, was expended.
It requests a total of $4,746.00 in
restitution. The form is dated November 14, 2012 and signed by
Mr. Vogt, a licensed attorney.
(R., p.37.)

The district court also took "judicial notice of the times in the court minutes
of this case where a deputy prosecuting attorney was present" and found that,
"[e]xcluding the dates and times for September 11, 12, and 13, 2012 ... which
represent the mistrial and time spent rescheduling ... the actual time in court
from the minutes spent prosecuting this case [w]as 20.4 hours," which "includ[ed]
sentencing and the rider review hearing." (R., p.38.) The court further noted
several pleadings that the "deputy prosecutor prepared, signed, and filed." (R.,
p.38.) The court then concluded:
The State's Statement of Costs and Request for Restitution
in a Drug Case is a signed accounting of the time spent by the Ada
County Prosecutor's Office prosecuting this case of 33.9 hours, not
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including sentencing. The signed statement states the attorney
rate for the office is $140.00 per hour. The signed Motion for
Restitution for Closing Argument states this is the amount charged
by Ada County in other criminal prosecution contexts, namely
cases related to the penitentiary, and in fact is the rate Ada County
charges all of its outside clients.
The Defendant has not presented any evidence to question
the accuracy of the state's accounting or to undermine or contradict
that accounting.
Therefore, the Court finds the State has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence and by substantial evidence that ..
. the Ada County Prosecutor's Office incurred the expense of
$4,746.00 in prosecuting these cases.
In reviewing the time actually before the court for purposes
of this hearing as noted in the court minutes, an attorney assigned
to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office spent 20.4 hours actually in
court. This accounting of time is only from the call of the case to
the conclusion of the matter and does not include travel to or from
the courtroom or time spent related to other cases heard on the
same days. In review of the matters filed in this case, including a
written objection to the motion to suppress, and time necessary to
prepare for voir dire and a three-day jury trial (and excluding the
time for the first trial which resulted in a mistrial), this Court finds
that the additional 13.5 hours requested to prepare these filings,
engage in discovery, prepare for the hearings, and prepare for trial,
including scheduling and interviewing witnesses, is reasonable.
The time included for the accounting can include preparation and
travel for hearings, not just the actual time in appearing for hearing
or trial. State v. Weaver, [supra]. The accounting is substantial
evidence of the time the deputy prosecutor spent prosecuting this
case and the hourly rate for such prosecution.
(R., p.39.)

On appeal, Nelson contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
restitution award for a number of reasons. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-33.) First,
Nelson argues that the "law of the case" based on the Court of Appeals' opinion
prior to remand established "that the prosecutor's unsworn representation of the
amount of the costs was insufficient as a matter of law to be the sole basis for
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the restitution award." (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-24.) Nelson then contends that
the district court's "order was based only on the prosecutor's written
representation of the loss, which was essentially the same as the representation
he made at the initial sentencing hearing."

(Appellant's Brief, p.24.)

"Thus,"

Nelson concludes, "the district court's finding ... was impermissible because it
was directly contrary to the law of the case established during the first appeal."
(Appellant's Brief, p.24.) Nelson's argument is belied by the record.
On the initial appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that the "district court
entered the restitution award without any evidence as to what the costs of
prosecution were," and it erred in "declin[ing] a request for an evidentiary hearing
after Nelson objected to the state's inadmissible proffer," which was an "oral,
unsworn representation." Nelson at 5-6. While Nelson is correct that the Court
of Appeals concluded the "oral, unsworn representation" was insufficient, the
prosecutor's request on remand was not, as Nelson suggests, "essentially the
same." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) The amount requested was the same, but on
remand, the state submitted an exhibit reflecting the basis for the state's request
(Exhibit 1), and Nelson never asserted to the district court that the exhibit was
inadmissible, she only claimed it was insufficient (see Tr., pp.45-48; R., pp.3133). Further, the court's award was not "based only on the prosecutor's written
representation of the loss," as Nelson claims.

(Appellant's Brief, p.24.) That

much is readily apparent from the excerpts of the district court's memorandum
decision set forth above.
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Nelson next argues that the district court's conclusion that "$140 per hour
represented the prosecutor's actual rate of pay based on his actual regular
salary ... is not supported by the evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) In support
of this assertion, Nelson points to defense counsel's written objection that the
rate "is improper" because it "appears unlikely to be an a accurate reflection of
the handling attorney's pay."

(Appellant's Brief, p.24 (quoting R., p.33).)

Defense counsel's argument does not constitute evidence.

While the district

court could consider Nelson's assertion that she did not believe the hourly rate
cited by the prosecutor was proper, that assertion is not evidence and, the reality
is, there was no evidence to contradict the state's claim. Nor did Nelson provide
the district court with any of the information she relies on in this appeal in an
effort to demonstrate the hourly rate is inaccurate. (Compare Appellant's Brief,
p.25 with R., p.33.) This Court should, therefore, decline to consider it.
In

a related

argument,

Nelson complains that the district court

"inappropriately flipped the burden of proof in regard to the rate of pay evidence."
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Nelson is incorrect. The district court's observation that
Nelson failed to "present[ ] any evidence that $140.00 does not represent the
expenses actually incurred by the Ada County Prosecutor's Office paid as
regular salaries of employees prosecuting this case," does not demonstrate
improper burden shifting. The district court's statement on this point, when read
in context, reveals that the court was responding to Nelson's arguments that the
rate was "unreasonable," by noting that Nelson presented no evidence in support
of the argument.

While it is clearly the state's burden to present evidence in
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support of its restitution request, it is equally clear that, when that evidence is
unrebutted, the trial court can make a factual finding with respect to the only
evidence presented. See Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 230 ("Although
Weaver questioned the accuracy of the state's accounting, he presented no
evidence to undermine or contradict that accounting.").
Nelson next argues that the restitution award "improperly includes time
prosecuting" the felony injury to child charge on which Nelson was acquitted.
(Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Nelson's contention that prosecution costs related to a
jury trial involving multiple counts could be parsed so finely is unrealistic. See
Weaver, 158 Idaho at_, 345 P.3d at 229-230 (a "certified accounting" of time
spent prosecuting the case "even if only an estimate, constitutes substantial
evidence sufficient" to support a restitution award; the applicable standard is
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt).
Nelson also argues the restitution award cannot include the "notinsignificant amount of time" spent "on the third day of the second trial" that was
"dedicated to prosecuting the co-defendant" on a sentencing enhancement.
(Appellant's Brief, p.30.) In actuality, this is not a claim that the evidence was
insufficient, it is more properly stated as a claim that the court abused its
discretion by improperly including restitution amounts for which Nelson should
not be liable. To the extent the Court finds the district court erred in that regard,
the remedy for that is to remand for recalculation of the restitution award to
exclude that amount; the remedy is not to vacate the award based on insufficient
evidence.
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Finally, Nelson contends the district court erred by including time the
district court was in recess during trial, including the time the jury was
deliberating.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.31-32.) According to Nelson, "there is no

evidence suggesting the prosecutor was working on the case against Ms. Nelson
during those recesses."

(Appellant's Brief, p.32.)

Nelson is, again, incorrect.

There is evidence, in the form of Exhibit 1, that the prosecutor worked on her
case for 33.9 hours.

That the district court's award is based on its own

breakdown of how the prosecutor's time was spent, which includes recesses,
does not mean "there is no evidence suggesting the prosecutor was working"
during those recesses. If Nelson wanted to rebut the evidence that 33.9 attorney
hours were spent prosecuting her case, she could have done so in the district
court. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the district court's determination that
33.9 hours of prosecution time is compensable under I.C. § 37-2732(k) is
supported by substantial evidence. Nelson has failed to show otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
Memorandum

Decision and Order on

Restitution, the court's Amended

Judgment of Conviction and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, and the court's Order
for Restitution and Judgment.
th

DATED this 18 day of September, 2015.
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